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That equity has jurisdiction over nuisance when the other
remedies of the injured person, either'at common law or by
his own action, are insufficient, is universally acknowledged.
From the very nature of the acts causing the injury we
can hardly imagine a case of nuisance in which an action
for damages is an adequate remedy. Therefore, in prac-
tically every case of nuisance it is proper to bring a bill in
equity to abate it, In many cases, however, the plaintiff,
bringing his bill in the only forum which can give him
an efficient remedy, is met by the objection that he can have
no permanent relief until he has proceeded against the de-
fendant at law, and, by obtaining a judgment, proved that
he has a right and that the defendant is infringing that
right.
It is 'now usually admitted that the rule just referred to
applies only to applications for a permanent injunction
where the right of the plaintiff, or the fact that the defend-
ant is infringing that right, is a matter of dispute between
the parties. Should the plaintiff fail to allege in his bill
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that he has secured a judgment at law in his favor against
the defendant, the omission does not now usually make the
bill demurrable.' By his demurrer the defendant admits
tie plaintiff's allegation. No question being in dispute,
the Court cannot be further enlightened by a judgment at
law in the plaintiff's favor. So also the rule that the plain-
tiff must first establish his right at law does not apply where
the defendant in his answer, while he denies the plaintiff's
right, shows that there is no real question in dispute between
the plaintiff and himself in respect to the plaintiff's sub-
stantive rights or in regard to his, the defendant's, own
violation of those rights.2  As stated, the rule has no appli-
cation to a motion for a preliminary injunction. It is -true
that if the right of the plaintiff is disputed and doubtful,
that fact is a very good reason why a preliminary injunction
'Soltau v. De Held, 2 Sim., N. S. 133, 1851, p. 15,; Aldrich v.
Howard, 7 R. I. 87, i861, p. 94. But see contra, Coe v. Winnepisiogee
Mfg. Co., 37 N. H. 254, i858; Green v. Lake, 54 Miss. 540, 1877, p. 544.
"'But it was not so much against the general jurisdiction of the
court, that the objection is raised, as to its exercise, when the defend-
ant, as in this case, denies the complainant's right. It is the province
of this Court, as the defendant's counsel insist, not to try this right,
that belonging alone to a court of law, but to quiet the possession when-
ever that right has been ascertained and settled. If it be intended
to say, that a defendant setting up this right by his answer, thereby at
once ousts this court of jurisdiction, I cannot assent to it, for it would
put an end, very much, to the exercise of an important branch of the
powers of the court. This question of right to water is often a very
debateable matter, and it would be quite easy for a defendant to satisfy
his conscience in his own favor. If it be intended to go no further, than
that it is a question which should be sent to law in case of doubt, and
often should before injunction be first there established by trial and
judgment, then I agree to the proposition. A long enjoyment by a
party of a right, will entitle him to restrain a private nuisance, even
though the defendant may deny the right, and the Court will exercise
its discretion whether to order a trial at law or not, always inclining to
put the case to a jury if there be reasonable doubt. In the case cited
from 2 John Chan. the Chancellor refused to send the question of
right to be tried at law, saying it was clear enough; and a case is cited
from Prec. in Ch. 530, where a plaintiff who had long been in posses-
sion of a water-course, was quieted by injunction, though he had not
established his right at law." Chancellor Pennington in Shields v. Arndt,
4 N. J. Eq. 234, 1842, p. 245. If the rule does not apply in cases of
alleged trespasses on easements where there is no real dispute between
the parties a fortiori it should not apply in cases of nuisance when
there is no real dispute between the parties.
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should not be granted; but where the injury threatened is
immediate and irreparable, even though the Chancellor may
regard the right of the plaintiff as doubtful, he may, by a
temporary injunction, prevent the threatened injury to the
plaintiff pending the trial of an action at law.
There remain, however, a considerable number of cases
in which the answer of the defendant, or the subsequent
investigation, develops the fact that there is a real dispute
between the parties, either in regard to the plaintiff's rights,
or, admitting those rights, as to whether the act of the defend-
ant is causing the interruption to the exercise of his rights
of which the plaintiff complains. In this class of cases there
is authority to prove that courts of equity often consider it
incumbent on them to refrain from deciding the disputed
question, requiring the plaintiff to first prove his case at
law before they will grant a permanent injunction.3
On its face a rule which requires one suffering from an
alleged wrong to go to one tribunal to prove his case and
to another tribunal for his only efficient remedy, does not
appear to have been adopted in the interest of the quick and
efficient administration of justice. In the cases it is hard
'The following cases are examples of the refusal of a court of
equity to grant permanent relief in cases of nuisance until the plaintiff
has established his right at law: Goodall v. Crofton, 33 Ohio, 271,
1877 (Vibration, 'due to the defendant's machinery); Kingsbury v.
Flowers, 65 Ala. 479, 188o (Application to restrain a private burying
ground on account of prospective injury to health); Kennerty v. Eti-
wan Phosphate Co., 17 S. C. 411, i881 (Plaintiff complained of the
fumes from the defendant's works); New Castle v. Raney, 130 Pa. 546,
1889 (It was alleged that a dam had become a nuisance because of the
cess-pools which drained into it); Wood v. McGrath, 15o Pa. 451, 1892
(The case involved a private drain under a public street).
The rule has also been freely applied to those so-called nuisances
which are really trespasses on easements and which as shown in the
text, are 'torts of an essentially different character than the alleged
torts in the cases just cited. See for example, Roath v. Driscoll, 20
Conn. 533, 185o. (The defendant was taking water to the detriment of
the easement claimed by the plaintiff); Earl of Ripon v. Hobart, 3
M. & K. i6g, 1834 (The defendant, a public body, took water from a
stream against the protest of the plaintiff, another public corporation) ;
Sterling v. Littlefield, 97 Me. 479, 1903 (Alleged interruption of a
private right of way).
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to find any serious attempt to state the reason for the rule.
Usually the necessity for sending the plaintiff to law in
doubtful cases is taken as axiomatic; a sure sign that the
reason is not generally understood. It has been said that
for a court of equity to decide a doubtful question of fact
is to trespass on the province of the jury.4 Yet, in other
cases of alleged tort, in cases of waste, in trade-mark cases,.
and cases of unfair trade competition, equity is repeatedly
called upon to determine difficult questions of fact; but,
notwithstanding this, in these cases there never has been
any thought that the Court was trespassing on the province
of the jury. Itistruethat in manycases-and it is not unlikely
that this may often apply to cases of nuisance in which the
facts are disputed-it is an advantage to have the testimony
taken in open court where the witnesses may be examined
and cross-examined. A trial at law secures this advantage.
But the Chancellor has also a right to try a case by sum-
moning the witnesses before him, and in some jurisdiftions,
as, for instance, in Pennsylvania, the Court is required to
try the case, unless the parties themselves agree to refer it
to an examiner. It may also be admitted that in cases of
alleged nuisance a jury is often a better tribunal to deter-
mine a disputed question of fact than a judge. In such
cases, however, the rule that the court of equity must refrain
from acting until the plaintiff has established his right at
law is unnecessary, because it is always within the discre-
tion of the Chancellor to order a feigned issue or direct that
the plaintiff's bill stand over until he has tested his right by
a suit at law. The equitable jurisdiction over nuisance is
concurrent with the jurisdiction of the courts of law. His
jurisdiction, not being exclusive, the Chancellor is not obliged
to determine a doubtful question if he believes that justice
'In New Castle v. Raney,, 130 Pa. 546, 1889, 562, the late Chief
Justice Paxson, of Pennsylvania, speaking of cases in which the Court
is asked to restrain a public nuisance said: "It was never intended,
and I do not know of a case in the books where the Chancellor has
usurped the functions of a jury, and attempted to decide disputed
questions of fact, and pass upon conflicting evidence in such cases."
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will be better served by having the disputed question of
right determined by a common law tribunal. But, there are
many nuisance cases in which a judge, or even a master, is
much better fitted to determine the disputed questions than
a jury. There is no reason why these cases should be sent
to law in order to secure a common law trial in those cases
in which such a trial is a real advantage. The advantage of
the jury trial, in those cases in which it is an advantage,
could be obtained, although the profession had never heard
of the rule we are discussing.
If a rule of law has apparently no foundation in reason,
we usually find that history gives us, if not a reason carry-
ing its own justification, at least an explanation. 5
The history of the origin of the rule in this country is
clear. For much good and some evil our ideas of the extent
and the limitations of equity jurisdiction have been, and
still are, largely controlled by the decisions, and even the
dicta of Lord Eldon. That Lord Eldon thought that it
was improper to issue a permanent injunction in cases of
alleged nuisance unless the plaintiff had established his right
at law is shown by his opinions in the cases of Attorney-
General v. Cleaver6 and Crowder v. Tinkler.7  The
first case was a bill to restrain a manufacturing plant on
the ground that it was a public nuisance; its operation being
offensive and unwholesome. The second case was a bill to
restrain the defendants from erecting a corning-house or
magazine near the paper mill of the defendant. In neither
'Mr. John N. Pomeroy, Jr., in speaking of the rule says: "Doubt-
less the explanation of it is largely the fact that in early days the
courts of equity were reluctant to undertake the decision of purely
legal rights, or questions of fact which ordinarily were tried by a jury.
It was a rule of expediency and policy, rather than an essential condition
and basis of equitable jurisdiction." This explanation, the reader will
notice, is in part the one given in the text. See Pom. Eq. Rem. Sec. 522
(Ed. i9o5). The quotation is from Pom. Eq. Jur. Vol. 1, Sec. 252. In
his Equitable Remedies 519, 522, inclusive, Mr. Pomeroy gives by far the
clearest and most complete exposition of the present status of the rule
known to the writer.
6 18 Ves. 211, I8I.
T i9 Ves. 617, I816.
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case would Lord Eldon even issue a preliminary injunction.
In the second case he put the question of the plaintiff's right
in a more expeditious way to be tried at law; but in the first
case, on account of some delay on the part of the relators,
he did not go so far. All through his opinions in both cases
it is clear that he regards it necessary that the disputed
questions should be passed on by a jury. "Admitting," he
says, in Attorney-General v. Cleaver, "the jurisdiction, the
question comes at last very much to this: whether, if the
Court may grant an injunction, but ought not without a
trial by jury, I am authorized to interpose by granting an
injunction in the interval; considering the defendants as
standing precisely in the same situation as if such a trial
had taken place."
If anything further was needed to fasten the belief on
the profession in this country that a previous trial at law
was necessary in cases of nuisance where any real question
of the plaintiff's right arose, it was supplied by Chancellor
Kent in his opinion in Van Bergen v. Van Bergen.8 He
says: "The cases in which chancery has interfered by
injunction, to prevent or remove a private nuisance, are
those in which the nuisance has been erected to the prejudice
or annoyance of a right which the other party had long pre-
viously enjoyed. It must be a strong and mischievous case
of pressing necessity or the right must have been previously
established at law, to entitle the party to call to his aid the
jurisdiction of this court." Kent, in this, as in other cases,
merely aided in transferring, not in enlarging or restricting,
the jurisdiction of the High Court of Chancery as he found
it in the English Reports of the eighteenth and early nine-
teenth centuries. We may conclude, therefore, that the rule
requiring a trial at common law in doubtful cases of nui-
sance is of English origin. It does not come from any oppo-
sition to the Court of Chancery, or from any admiration
for the system of trial by jury, peculiar to this country.
a3 Johns. Chancery 282, I88.
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Down to the end of the first quarter of the nineteenth
century, the idea that all cases involving the legal title to real
property should be tried by jury in a common law action
was firmly imbedded in the professional mind. The
origin of this idea was probably the same as that which
put into Magna Carta the words: "No freeman's body shall
be taken or imprisoned * * * excepting by the judgment
of his peers * * *".-the feeling, in other words, that a
man should not be ousted of the possession of his property
by the judgment of an official, as by the king or a judge, but
only by the judgment of his neighbors and equals.
It was natural that desire for a jury trial in all disputes
of title should be especially strong in cases involving dis-
putes over real property. Social standing depended on the
possession of this class of property. On the other hand, we
are not surprised to find the court of equity in the early part
of the eighteenth century freely passing on disputed ques-
tions of title to that form of incorporeal property known as
copyright, without sending the plaintiff to law to establish his
right. Literary property in the printed and published
work, if not created, was first definitely recognized by the
Statute of Anne,9 and the possession of this class of prop-
erty was without special social significance.
'While the feeling that disputes over title to the posses-
sion of real property should be determined by a jury at
common law, was not strong enough to deter the court of
equity from recognizing and enforcing the legal holders'
obligation to the cestui que use, it was strong enough to pre-
vent that court from determining a disputed question of
title to real property when the plaintiff came to the Chan-
cellor, not because the common law courts refused to recog-
nize his substantive right, but because the common law
remedy was inadequate to fully protect the plaintiff, admit-
ting him to have rights to protect. If B, under a claim of
'For a reference to the early cases in chancery upon the right given
by the Statute of Anna, see 7 Brown's P. C. ioo, 2d London Ed., 1779.
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legal title, attempted to take possession of real property
which was in the possession of A, the Court of Chancery
would not, at A's instance, protect his possession, because
to do so would require the Court to pass on and decide finally
the dispute over the title. Thus, down to the time of Lord
Eldon, there was no jurisdiction in equity over trespass to
real property. He tells us himself, that he remembers per-
fectly "being told from the Bench very early in life, that if
the plaintiff filed a bill for an account, and an injunction
to restrain waste, stating that the defendant claimed by a
title adverse to his, he stated himself out of court as to the
injunction." 10  So strong was the feeling that the Court of
Chancery was not the proper tribunal to try a dispute over
legal title to real property, that we do not find any instance
in which Lord Eldon issued even a temporary injunction to
restrain a trespasser pending an action at law to determine
the disputed title to the land. He, indeed, issued injunc-
tions to restrain certain technical trespassers, but the facts
of the cases in which he took such action show, either that
there was no dispute over title, or that the defendants' acts
were analogous to waste."
" Pillsworth v. Hopton, 6 Ves. 51, i8oi.
"The statement in the text is borne out by an examination of the
facts of the following cases-technically cases of trespass-in which
Lord Eldon granted an injunction: Mitchell v. Dors, 6 Ves. 147, i8Ol
(The defendant in mining coal from his own land had dug under the
land of the plaintiff, his neighbor. There was no dispute as to title) ;
Courthope v. Mapplesden, Io Ves. 290, 18o4 (The defendant, a stranger,
conspired with the tenants of the plaintiff in the cutting of timber);
Crockford v. Alexander, 15 Ves. 138, i8o8 (B agreed to buy land from
A. B obtained possession from the tenant, C, and began to cut timber.
At the instance of A, an injunction issued to restrain B); Thomas v.
Oakley, 18 Ves. 184, 1811 (The defendant exceeded the authority which
the plaintiff had given him to take stone from the plaintiff's land for
one purpose by taking the stone for another purpose). In Jones v.
Jones, 3 Merivale 16o, 1817, at p. 173, Sir-William Grant says: "No
case was cited in which the Court has interfered, at the suit of heir
or devisee, to restrain waste, spoil or destruction, by either, while they
are litigating their adverse rights in a court of law." The Master of
the Rolls does not see any very good reason why "the Court, which
interferes for the preservation of personal property pending a suit
in the Ecclesiastical Court, should not interpose to preserve real prop-
erty pending a suit concerning the validity of the devise," and he does
REQUIRING PLAINTIFF TO ESTABLISH RIGHT AT LAW 297
The reported chancery cases of the eighteenth century
show us that the rule that the Court could not protect a right
in real property if the title to the property was in dispute
until a trial at law had settled the question of title was
applied, not only to trespass on an alleged right to the exclu-
sive possession of real property, but also to all cases of
alleged trespass on easements. If A, for instance, claimed
an easement to have light and air come from B's land to
his, A's, ancient window, and B erected a building which
took away this easement, there could be no final settlement
of the dispute except at law.12 So also, if the plaintiff
sought to have equity protect his alleged easement in a
stream from the acts of one who denied the easement, or its
existence to the extent claimed by the plaintiff.13 The chan-
cery was not considered the proper tribunal to protect a
right of common, 14 or the right to a fishery or an oyster
bed, 15 until the plaintiff established his right at law. Neither
could the Chancellor determine in the first instance a dis-
puted title to a private or public franchise, as an alleged
right to appoint a gamekeeper, or the exclusive right to
supply a town with water.16 So firmly implanted in the pro-
fessional mind was the idea that disputes which involved
not admit that he has not the right to do so, though in the case before
him he refused the relief. Historically, the reason for the anomaly
referred to seems clear. The idea that a jury should decide questions
of dis'puted title was more apt, as is pointed out in the text, to be per-
petuated in cases involving property which has a social in addition to
its economic value; and besides the Ecclesiastical Court was not a
court having a jury as part of its machinery.
'In Ryder v. Bentham, i Ves. Sr. 543, 175o, a case involving such
a trespass, Lord Hardwicke said that it was agreed that the dispute
must be tried at law. See also Fishmongers' Co. v. The East India Co..
I Dick. 163, 1752; Attorney-General v. Bentham, i Ves. Sr. 543, S. C.
i Dick. 277, 1755; Birch v. Holt, 3 Atk. 726, i75o.
' Weller v. Smeaton, i Bro. Ch. (Second London edition, 1790), 572
1784, repudiating the earlier case of Bush v. Western, Finch's Pre. in
Ch. 530, i72o, before Lord Macclesfield.
" Pawlet v. Ingrey, 1 Vern. 308, 1684.
'Duke of Dorset v. Girdler, Finch Pre. Ch. 531, 172o, fishery;
Lord Tenhain v. Herbert, 2 Atk. 483, 1742, fishery; Welby v. Duke of
Rutland, 2 Bro. P. C. (London edition, 1783), 575, 1773, oyster bed."' Whitchurch v. Hide, 2 Atk. 391, 1742. The idea was also naturally
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the determination of title to this class of property could not
be settled in chancery, that an application for a tempQrary
injunction, pending the decision of the title at law, to pre-
vent a trespass on the alleged easement, was always refused
unless the defendant also threatened physical destruction to
the plaintiff's tangible property, 17 or the total deprivation of
his enjoyment of the alleged easement.' 8 In ordinary cases
the most that the Chancellor would do Was to insist that
the defendant did not raise technical objections to the early
determination of the dispute at law.' 0 And even this slight
extended to a case in which the plaintiff sought protection to a right
burdensome on the public, as a right claimed by a municipal corpora-
tion to lay a tax on importers of cheese. See the Mayor of London v.
Perkin. 4 Bro. P. C. (London edition, 1781), 157, 1734.
" Robinson v. Lord Byron, i Bro. C. C. (Second London edition),
588, 1790. In this case the tenant was depriving a mill owner of his
easement in the water of the stream which ran his mill, by at one
time stopping the water and at another letting it flow down in such
quantities as to endanger the mill. A trial at law of an action for
damages was pending (see Lord Eldon's statement in Crozwder v.
Tinkler, 19 Ves. p. 625). Lord Thurlow restrained the defendant from
"using dams, weirs, shuttles, floodgates and other erections otherwise
than he had done before the 4th of April, 1785." He would not have
issued the injunction had not the defendant recently changed his use
of the stream, and had the plaintiff not complained of the result of this
recent change in use.
'Ryder v. Bentham, i Ves. Sr. 543, 175o; Attorney-General v. Gray's
Inn Society, 2 Ves. Sr. 453, 1752; remarks of Lord Hardwicke;
Attorney-General v. Bentham, z Dick. 277, 1755. These are all cases
of disputes over ancient lights. The injunction was issued to prevent the
stoppage of the lights pending the trial at law. In Attorney-General v.
Nichol, 16 Ves. 337, 18o9, Lord Eldon refused to issue an injunction
in such a case because the plaintiff's affidavits merely stated that his
ancient lights would be darkened by the building that the defendant
was erecting. Sir Samuel Romilly had argued for the defendant that
to warrant the injunction there must be a total deprivation of light, not
a mere obstruction. See also to the same effect Wynstanley v. Lee, 2
Swan, 333, 1818, a case before Vice-Chancellor Plumber. On the other
hand in Attorney-General v. Johnson, 2 Will. Ch. 87, 181, Lord Eldon
granted a temporary injunction, at the instance of the Attorney-
General, to restrain the defendant filling up of a river pending the trial
of an indictment for the alleged offense in the King's Bench. Com-
pare, Arthington v. Fawks, 2 Vern. 356, 1697, where a temporary injunc-
tion was granted protecting the plaintiff's alleged right to enclose a
common pending the trial of the issue at law.
9 Birch v. Holt, 3 Atk. 726, 175o, a case before Lord Hardwicke
involving an interference in an alleged right in a mill dam; Fishmongers'
Co. v. East India Co., i Dick. 163, 1752, a case also before Lord Hard-
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modification of the rule that the Chancellor would not help
the plaintiff until he had established his right at law was
an advance on the attitude taken in cases of ordinary tres-
pass; no instance in the eighteenth century being recorded
of a temporary injunction having been issued, pending a
trial at law, to restrain the person who, under a claim of
right, attempted to oust the plaintiff from his possession
of the soil.
If we recognize the existence of the conviction that equity
cannot decide a disputed question of title to real property in
a case where the jurisdiction of chancery is concurrent with
courts of law, the refusal to issue a permanent, and in most
instances a temporary injunction, to protect the plaintiff's
possession of his alleged easement, is inevitable. If A
claims an easement of light, or a way, or a right in a run-
ning stream, and B denies the claim, the question at issue
may be one of two kinds. First, B may deny that A has any
easement, either because he has no title to the land to which
the alleged easement is said to be attached, or because,
admitting A's title to the land, no easement is appendant
thereto. In this class of cases, the fact that a question of
title is in issue is clear. Second, B may admit the easement,
but deny that he is a trespasser because he denies that the
easement is as extensive as A claims. The dispute in this
last case is similar to a dispute over boundaries between two
neighboring land owners, and its settlement equally involves
a settlement of disputed title. Theoretically, a third class of
cases may arise, in which the defendant is a mere wanton
trespasser without claim of right, but practically such a case
cannot be found in the early books. The position, therefore,
wicke, involving a trespass on an alleged ancient light. Lord Hard-
wicke said: "And as to the question whether the plaintiff's messuage
is an ancient building, so as to entitle them to the right of the lights,
and whether the plaintiff's lights will be darkened, I will not determine
it here; for if it clearly appeared that what the defendants are doing
is what the law considers a nuisance, I would put it in a way to be
tried." In the case before him the plaintiffs "took nothing" by their
motion, because it did not "clearly appear," etc.
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that a court of equity should not protect an easement until
the plaintiff had established his right at law, was consistent
with the Chancellor's refusal to take jurisdiction over cases
of alleged trespass.
There was, indeed, a class of cases in which some of the
Chancellors maintained the right to pass finally on disputes
over title to easements. These were cases in which many
persons claimed different easements, the claim to each being
denied by a person who asserted a right incompatible with
the existence of any of the easements claimed; as of the
tenants of a manor claiming a right of common to an extent
denied by the lord of the manor,20 or a municipal corpora-
tion claiming the right to fish in a stream to the detriment
of similar rights claimed by the different riparian owners. 1
These cases may be supported, and were in part supported
at the time, on the ground that the action of equity in taking
jurisdiction prevented a multiplicity of suits. This, of
course, merely means, that while the desire to prevent-dis-
turbance of possession of real property was not, in the great
majority of cases, strong enough to overcome the feeling
that chancery should not settle a dispute as to title, where
the legal title could not be settled finally at law because of
the multitude of parties against whom separate actions
would have to be brought, some chancellors, as Lord
Hardwicke, were willing to overcome their scruples and pass
finally on the question of legal title, in order to settle in one
proceeding the whole controversy.
Though the Court of Chancery, in the eighteenth century,
when asked to restrain the infringement of a right in real
property, never, except on the ground of preventing a mul-
tiplicity of suits, undertook to decide a dispute as to legal
title, it had no hesitation in deciding in such a case a dis-
puted question pertaining to the existence at common law of
' How v. Tenants of Bromsgrove, i Vern. 22, i681.
' Mayor of York v. Pilkington, i Atk. 282, 1737. See also Eweline
Hospital v. Andover, i Vern. 266, 1684.
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the right which the plaintiff claimed, or the fact of infringe-
ment. The jurisdiction over waste is an illustration of
this. In a case involving the application to a Chan-
cellor for an injunction to stay waste a dispute
over title is impossible. By the very definition of the tort
the plaintiff must admit that the defendant is in lawful
possession of the property. Waste is an injury to the inheri-
tance done by one having a limited estate during the contin-
uance of the limited estate. The plaintiff is always a re-
mainderman; the defendant the holder of a limited estate
carved out of the same title. When the plaintiff brings his
bill only two classes of questions can arise. First, those
which relate to the extent of the rights over the property
which the common law gives to the holder of that temporary
estate which the plaintiff admits the defendant to possess.
Second, those which relate to the acts which the defendant
is doing. A disputed question falling under the first class
is almost always a question of law. For even though the
law varies the extent of the rights of the holder of the
limited estate in accordance with the purpose to which the
land was devoted by the last holder in fee and the physical
characteristics of the land, these purposes and physical
characteristics-although of course questions of fact-are
not often in dispute. On the other hand, a disputed ques-
iton falling under the second head is, of course, always a
question of fact. The inadequacy of the action of waste,
arising not so much from the remedy given the plaintiff, as
from the technicality which limited those who could bring
the action to those who held immediate remainders in fee
or fee tail, afforded early opportunity to the chancellor to
obtain jurisdiction over the subject and issue injunctions to
restrain holders of the temporary estates overstepping the
limits of their rights to the injury of the land and those who
held in remainder. Yet we never hear the defendants claim-
ing that the disputed questions of law and fact should be
passed on by a jury.
Now, in cases involving a discussion over an alleged
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nuisance, no question of title arises, any more than such a
question arises in cases involving a discussion of an alleged
act of waste. Nuisance includes all those cases-and if the
word is properly employed only those cases-in which the
act of the defendant does not involve a trespass. The
plaintiff in a case of alleged nuisance does not complain of
any taking or of any disturbance of his possession. The
plaintiff complains only of the defendant's unlawful inter-
ference with his, the plaintiff's, use of his property. This
interference with the plaintiff's use, is not due to interrupted
possession; or, if it is, the defendant is not committing a
nuisance-his acts amount to a trespass.
The possible questions which may arise in nuisance, as in
waste, relate to the extent of the common law rights of the
possessor of real property, and the extent to which the
defendant has interrupted those rights. As in waste, a
question falling under the first class is usually, but not
necessarily, a question of law; one falling under the second
class is necessarily a question of fact; but neither can inv6lve
a question of title. If B, the neighbor of A, being a manu-
facturer, annoys A by the noise and smoke from his, B's,
factory, in order to determine whether B's acts in running
his factory amount to a nuisance we must first determine
the extent to which A, as the occupier of land, has, in view
of the situation of that land, a right to be free from being
disturbed by smoke and noise. This question is in part a
question of fact-what is the character of the neighborhood
in which the land is situated?; in part a question of law-
admitting the neighborhood to be of a definite character, has
A the legal right to be free from the smoke and noise of
which he complains? Again-and these fall under the second
class-there may be two additional questions; namely, how
far A is annoyed by the smoke and noise, and how far the
smoke and noise which annoys him comes. from B's factory?
These are both questions of facts. The moment that B
claims a right, beyond that which the law gives him as a
holder of property, to fill A's land with smoke or vibrate
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the air over it with violent sound waves, hi claims an ease-
ment over A's property, and the case is not a case of nui-
sance. If A claims a right to be free from smoke and noise,
to an extent beyond that which the law grants to him as
an owner of property situated as his property is situated,
lie claims an easement; and again, it is not a case of nuisance
but a case of alleged trespass on an easement.
Take, for instance, such a case as Green v. Lake, which
came before the Supreme Court of Mississippi in 1827.22
In that case the plaintiffs, the owners and occupiers of cer-
tain dwelling houses, brought their bill against the defend-
ant, the owner of a corn and flouring mill on, the opposite
side of the street, for an injunction to abate the mill as a
nuisance, alleging noise, danger from fire, and disease. The
Court sustained the defendant's demurrer on the ground
that, as the plaintiffs had not shown "imperious necessity,"
they should first establish their right at law. It will be
noticed that had the case been allowed to continue no dispute
over any question of title to real property could have arisen.
The only issues that could have developed were, the extent
of the harm which the defendant was inflicting on the
plaintiff, and the extent of the right of the plaintiff, in view
of the situation of his property, to be free from that harm.
The extent of the harm, the situations of the respective
properties of the plaintiff and defendant, were questions of
fact; the extent of the plaintiff's right, in view of the situa-
tion of the properties, to be free from interruption in the use
of their dwelling houses was a question of law; but it- is
impossible to suppose that any dispute over the titles of the
plaintiffs or defendant to their respective properties could
have arisen.
The result of our inquiry into the legal ideas of the
eighteenth century on the subject of the necessity of a pre-
vious trial at-law in certain chancery cases, and our analysis
of the classes of questions which may arise in cases of nui-
254 Miss. 540, 1877.
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sance is this: During the eighteenth century there was
firmly fixed in the mind of the profession the idea that the
Chancellor, when asked to restrain a tort, could not deter-
mine a question of disputed legal title to real property, and
that in such cases the Chancellor rarely gave even temporary
equitable relief, until the plaintiff had established his
right at law. This fact, however, does not explain
why a plaintiff in a case of alleged nuisance, where there
was a doubt as to his right, had to establish his right at law
before he obtained equitable relief. In nuisance a dispute
over title to real property cannot arise, and chancery could
then, as it can now, pass finally on disputed questions of fact
and disputed cases of law, when no question of title to real
property was involved.
Our problem, then, is to determine how the idea, that
in applications for injunctions to restrain a tort chancery
could not act if a dispute over title to real property arose
until that dispute had been settled at common law,- was, in
nuisance, transferred into the much broader proposition-
one which does not hold good in applications for injunctions
to restrain other torts-namely; that if, in an application
to restrain a nuisance, any real question of doubt and diffi-
culty arises, the Court is not competent to determine it,
but must send the plaintiff to law.
We have seen that Lord Eldon unquestionably regarded
it necessary in practically all cases of nuisances that the
plaintiffs should prove their rights at law before they had
permanent equitable relief, and that the adoption of the rule
in this country is due in a great measure to Lord Eldon's
opinion. Judged by the practice of the eighteenth century
was Lord Eldon mistaken, or did his opinion correctly reflect
the practice of his predecessors?
The reported chancery cases involving applications to
restrain nuisances prior to Lord Eldon's time are so few
that it is perhaps impossible to determine definitely whether
he correctly interpreted the practice of the eighteenth cen-
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tury. The fact that both he and Sir Samuel Romilly
23
thought it was proper that there should be a trial of law
in doubtful cases of nuisance is the best evidence we have
of the practice of the court, at least in the last quarter of
that century. On the other hand, Lord Loughborough
failed to refer to the practice when he issued a tem-
porary injunction on petition and affidavit to restrain a
defendant, at the instance of the Mayor of London, from
storing any more sugar in certain warehouses, two of the
defendant's houses having already collapsed. 24 Again, there
is no evidence that Lord Hardwicke would have sent a
doubtful case of nuisance to law; indeed, some evidence
that he would not have done so. The only reported case
of nuisance known to the writer, which came before Lord
Hardwicke was the case of Bains v. Baker,25 in which a
motion was made for an injunction to stay the building of
a house to inoculate for the smallpox. Lord Hardwicke
in that case denied the motion for three reasons. First, that
it was not settled that a house for the reception of inoculated
patients was a nuisance; second, that the nuisance, if aniy,
was a public one, and that there should have been an infor-
mation in the name of the Attorney-General; third, that
the fears of mankind, though they may be reasonable ones,
will not create a nuisance. As the case is reported he did
not say a word in regard to the necessity of a trial at law,
unless the first reason given may be taken to intimate such
a necessity. That Lord Hardwicke and his predecessors
of the earlier years of the eighteenth century did not, gen-
erally, lay as much stress on the necessity of a trial at law,
even where a question of title was involved, as Lord Eldon,
" See the latter's argument for the plaintiff in Attorney-General v.
Cleaver, I8 Ves. at p. 213.
' 5 Ves. 129, 1799. The case, of course, was one of pressing neces-
sity, and evidently there was little dispute over the right, either of the
plaintiff as mayor to protect the lives of the people, or the fact that the
defendant had no right to put his house to a use endangering the lives
of the citizens.
Arnb. i58, 1752.
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can be shown. We have pointed out that a trial at law has
never been considered necessary where the plaintiff brings
his bill to protect an infringement of a copyright, though a
question of title to incorporeal property is practically always
involved in such cases. Cases in which the Court of Chan-
cery issued an injunction to restrain an infringement on an
alleged copyright, are found during the terms of Cooper,
King and Hardwicke.2 6  Yet, when Lord Eldon was asked
to issue a permanent injunction to protect an alleged patent
right, he refused until the plaintiff had established his right
at law.27 The case before Lord Eldon was similar to those
cases which involved a disputed copyright, both a patent
right and a copyright being incorporeal rights having their
origin in a statute. The issuance of a permanent injunction
in the first part of the eighteenth century to protect a copy-
right, without the necessity for a previous trial at law, and
the insistance in the first part of the nineteenth century, on a
trial at law before a permanent injunction would i!sue to
protect a patent right, is evidence that the Chancellors of
the first half of the eighteenth century paid less attention
than did Lord Eldon to the necessity of a previous trial
at law, when, in an application to restrain a tort, a dispute
over title to property, not real property, arose. Again Lord
Hardwicke, though in Birch v. Bolt,28 when he was asked
to restrain a trespass on an alleged easement 29 merely put
the matter in the most expeditious way to be tried at law, in
his opinion in the case of the Mayor of York v. Pilkington3"
"7 Brown's P. C. (2d London Ed.) 100, 1783.
Hill v. Thompson, 3 Mer. 622, 1817. The good sense of Judge
Grier prevented the rule from being adopted by our Federal Courts.
In the leading case of Goodyear v. Day, 2 Wallace, Jr., 283, 1852, he
refused to send the plaintiff, who had brought a bill to protect himself
from an alleged infringement on his patent, to law to establish his
right; went into the disputed questions himself, and issued a permanent
injunction. This has been the practice ever since in 'similar cases in
this country.
"3 Atk. 726, 1750.
"Compare also his admission in Ryder v. Bentham, i Ves. Sr. 543,
175o, a case involving a trespass on an alleged ancient light.
0I Atkl 282, 1737.
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commends the action of Lord Macclesfield in Bush v. West-
ern. This last case was one in which Lord Macclesfield
issued a permanent injunction to restrain a trespass on an
alleged easement in water. The case was subsequently
repudiated by Lord Thurlow, and may be adrmitted to be
against all the other precedents of the eighteenth century.31
But though we cannot say with certainty that Lord Hard-
wicke or the other Chancellors of the first half of the eight-
eenth century would have sent the plaintiff in the doubtful
case of nuisance to establish his case at law, and though we
may admit that Lord Eldon, who practiced before Lord
Thurlow, might be inclined to exaggerate the professional
opinion as to the necessity for such a course, it is not diffi-
cult to give an explanation for Lord Eldon's opinion and
for the practice of his predecessors, if his opinion correctly
represents their practice. As has been already remarked, the
reported cases in equity in the eighteenth century involving
applications to restrain nuisances are very few. In all, we
have only two or possibly three reported cases.3 " Of course,
there were other cases of which we have no report. But un-
der our system of case law, when there are scarcely any re-
ported cases dealing with a subject, the profession is apt to
confuse the few reported cases with cases on other subjects
to which they have a superficial resemblance, and the surface
similarity between a trespass on an easement and a nuisance
has been sufficient to confuse modern judges, though the
principles pertaining to nuisance as a distinct tort are now
well developed. A rule, such as the rule requiring a plain-
tiff to establish his right at law before applying for equitable
relief, which it is admitted was very generally applied to
applications to restrain trespasses on easements, would be
more than likely to be applied to applications to restrain a
nuisance.
The main reason, however, for applying a rule applicable
' Finch's Pre. in Ch. 530, 1720. Weller v. Smeaton, i Bro. Ch.
(London edition, 1790), 572, 1784.
'Baines v. Baker, Amb. 158, 1752, a bill to restrain the erection of a
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to a bill to restrain a trespass on an easement to a bill to
restrain a nuisance is to be found in the confused nomen-
clature of our law. Originally, the term nuisance was prob-
ably applied to all torts for which an assize of nuisance would
lie. The assize of nuisance was designed to give one who
complained of the act of another on that other's own land
an efficient remedy. It was not material whether the act
amounted to a trespass on an easement claimed
by the plaintiff, as the stopping of his right of way,
or was an act which merely interrupted the plaintiff's use
of his own land, and did not involve a trespass, as
the maintenance by the defendant of an ill-smelling nui-
sance. In both cases the plaintiff for his full relief needed
an order against the defendant to abate the cause of the
injury. The assize of nuisance, therefore, was brought, not
only to restrain nuisances properly so-called, but trespasses
hospital to inoculate for the smallpox; Mayor of London v. Bolt, 5 Ves.
129, 1799, a bill to restrain the defendant overweighting his houses.
There is also a case called Morris v. Lessees of Lord Berkeley, 2 Ves.
Sr. 453, 1752, where the plaintiff apparently sought to have a building
erected on his neighbor's land restrained, not as a trespass on a pre-
scriptive right to have an unobstructed view, but as a true nuisance,
that is an interruption to his pleasant enjoyment of his own house.
The bill was dismissed. Lord Eldon also speaks of a case, the Duke of
Crafton v. Hilliard, in which the plaintiff sought to restrain, though
unsuccessfully, the burning of bricks. See 18 Ves. p. 219. This case
may have occurred in the eighteenth century.
A case in the Exchequer in 1795 shows that others shared Lord
Eldon's view of the necessity of a trial at law in doubtful cases of
nuisance, while at the same time indicating an important exception.
This is the case of Attorney-General v. Richards, 2 Ans. 603, 615, 1795,
an information for an injunction to prevent the obstruction of naviga-
tion in a public stream by the erection of a wharf. The erection was
also prima facia a perpresture, as the wharf was built between high
and low water mark. It was objected that the case should be tried
at law, but McDonald, Chief Baron, said: "That may be where the
question is of nuisance only, and the evidence doubtful. But the cases
cited and those which Lord Hale has given us in the treatise De Portibus
Maris, clearly prove, that where the King claims and perfects a right
to the soil, where a perpresture and nuisance have been committed, he
may have a decree to abate it!' This means that the learned judge
thought that the rule, which required that a plaintiff who would protect
what he claimed to be his property from one who denied his title, must
first prove his title at law, did not' apply to the King as owner of the
soil between low and high water mark, and that equity would protect
the King's right until the subject prove a better title.
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on easements.3 8 By the first part of the eighteenth century
the assize of nuisance had fallen into disuse, but we find
the chancery lawyers of that day speaking of a trespass on
an ancient light as a nuisance ;34 and though, in cases involv-
ing applications for injunctions to protect easements in
running water, we do not find the alleged tort of the defend-
ant referred to as a nuisance,35 this may be merely a coinci-
"F. N. B. 183 et sec.
" 4Attorney-General v. Bentham, i Dick. 277, 1755, is a case in which
a trespass on an ancient light is referred to as a nuisance. In Attorney-
General v. Doughty, 2 Ves. Sr. 453, 1752, Lord Hardwicke apparently
speaks of a trespass on an ancient light as a nuisance. See the third
sentence in his opinion, though the last paragraph in his opinion in
Fishmongers' Co. v. East India Co., I Dick. 163, 1752, would appear
to indicate that he recognized the difference between a trespass on an
ancient light, and the nuisance of making your neighbor's house un-
inhabitable by darkening his windows. In Morris v. Lessees of Lord
Berkeley, 2 Ves. Sr. 452, a case also decided in 1752, he holds that one
who would prevent another from darkening his windows must found
his right on a prescription or on an agreement. Fonblanque
in his notes to the Equity which bears his name, 3rd Ed., Vol. I,
p. 31, note, also confuses a trespass on a right to look over the land of
another, with nuisance, as he collects cases involving trespass on this
easement as illustrations of the jurisdiction of equity over nuisance.
' The reported equity cases of the eighteenth century involving a tres-
pass on an alleged easement in water are: Bush v. Western, Finch's
Pre. in Ch. 530, 172o; Birch v. Holt, 3 Atk. 726, 1750; Weller v. Snzea-
ton, I Bro. Ch. (London Ed. 1790), 572, 1784; Robinson v. Lord Byron,
i Bro. Ch. (London Edition) 588, 1790. In none of these is the
tort of the defendant spoken of as a nuisance. On the other hand, all
the early American cases in equity, involving a trespass on an easement
in water, speak of the defendant's act as a nuisance, not a trespass. See
for example, Chancellor Kent in Van Bergen v. Van Bergen, 3 Johns
Ch. 282, 18z8. Notice also that the American editors of Fonblanque's
Equity, Mr. Edward Ingraham and afterwards Mr. Anthony Laussat, in
adding American cases to the same work, give cases of trespasses on
water rights as illustrations of the Court's jurisdiction over nuisance.
See 4th American Edition, 1835, Vol. I, p. 49, notes.
The writer believes that the fact that the reported cases in the
eighteenth century involving trespasses on water rights are not referred
to in the equity reports as nuisance cases may be explained by the fact
that a successful interference in an alleged right in water involves an
act directly harmful to the plaintiff's property, as the pulling down
of his dam, or the direct taking of visible property in which the
plaintiff claims a right, as an upper riparian diverting the water claimed
by the lower riparian owner into another channel.
There was also a tendency still indeed observable, to apply the term
nuisance to any continuing injury caused by a series of similar acts on
the part of the defendant. Thus, in Coulson v. White, 3 Atk. 21, 1743,
Lord Hardwicke says that a common trespass, "if it continues so long
s to become a nuisance," may be restrained.
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dence, as an assize of nuisance would at an earlier time have
been brought for such an injury. 36 This confusion of two
fundamentally distinct classes of torts under the same name
has continued on both sides of the Atlantic down to our own
time.8
7
At the time of Lord Eldon and before, the natural result
of treating a trespass on an easement and the carrying on
of a noxious trade as torts which could be classified under
one name, was to apply the substantive rules of law appli-
cable to the more frequent tort of trespass on easements to
the less frequent tort of nuisance. A single illustration will
suffice to illustrate the confusion. As nuisance is an
interruption to the present use, a plaintiff cannot show a
nuisance by merely showing that what the defendant is
doing would seriously interrupt the plaintiff's use of his land.
The plaintiff must show that his present reasonable use is
interrupted by the act of the defendant.88 There is no possi-
bility of acquiring a prescriptive right to commit a nuisance
unless the acts on which the prescription is based have ac-
tually interfered with the enjoyment of the land in which
the prescriptive right is alleged to be acquired. To gain a
right by prescription one must assert a right inconsistent with
the right of another. Tf A has an empty field, to vibrate
the ether over it or fill the air with smoke is not asserting
rights which the owner of the land is in a position to deny.
Thus, where for many years B. in connection with his trade
as druggist, had used in his shop two large mortars, that fact
did not give B any right to continue to use the mortars when
their pounding prevented B's neighbor, a physician, from
using a room which he had recently constructed in the rear
of his house, as a consulting room. 89 Each has a right to use
his own land in any way he chooses, provided such use does
"F. N. B. 184.
" See, for example, Webb's Pollock on Torts, 491, edition of 1894.
, Jackson v. Duke of Newcastle, 3 De G. J. & S. 275, 1864, pp. 289,
291.
'Sturges v. Bridgman, L. R. ii Ch. D. 852, per. Jessel M. R.
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not prevent his neighbor from exercising an equal liberty.
The mere fact that A first begins to use his land, does not
give A a prescriptive right to prevent his neighbor, B, from
putting his land to any use which-not in view of A's use of
his, A's, land-but in view of the general character of the
neighborhood is a reasonable use. These are now recog-
nized as the fundamental rules of law pertaining to nui-
sance.40 Yet the doctrine that a man might acquire a pre-
scriptive right to do an act which would be a nuisance to his
neighbor, should that neighbor put his land to a certain use,
Elliotson v. FeethaNt, 2 Bing. N. C. 134, 1835; Brady v. Weeks, 3
Barb. 157, 1848; Campbell v. Seaman, 63 N. Y. 568, 1876; Bushnell v.
Robeson, 62 Iowa 540, 1883; Hurlbut v. McKone, 55 Conn. 31, 1887;
Van Fossen v. Clark, 84 N. W. 989, igoi; Attorney-General v. Man-
chester (1893), 2 Ch. Div. 87.
The difference between a trespass, considered as a tort involving
a dispute over possession of property, and nuisance, is well illustrated
by cases involving the pollution of streams. The riparian owner has
always been regarded as having an easement in the water. Any attempt
to take the water is regarded as a trespass on this easement, and
therefore, to prove his right to relief, the riparian owner does not have
to show that he is putting the stream to any use, or that the use which
he is making of the water is affected by the defendant's act; Webb v.
Portland Mnf. Co., 3 Sum. I89, 1838, per Story, J.; Parker v. Griswold,
17 Conn. 288, 1845; Miller v. Miller, 9 Pa. 74, 1848 That our law Should
regard the taking of water as a trespass rather than as a mere interrup-
tion of use, though not a necessary legal conception, is natural in view
of the fact that the typical case is the complaint by the lower riparian
owner of the diversion of water by an upper riparian owner. He who
diverts running water exercises, by a positive act, dominion over physi-
cal property in which, had the diversion not taken place, the lower
riparian owner would have presently had a temporary right of posses-
sion. But there is no reason why the principles of the tort nuisance
should not be applied to the pollution of a stream unless the deposit of
filth on the bed of the stream permanently corrupts it, or unless such
deposit, by choking the way, alters the direction or depth of the stream.
And yet the tendency of the cases is unquestionably to treat a polluter
of a stream as a trespasser on an easement belonging to the riparian
owner-the easement to have the water run pure-and, therefore, to
prevent such pollution, though the plaintiff does not show any present
damage from the pollution, the pollution not interfering with any use
to which the plaintiff is putting the water. See, for example, Crossley
v. Lightowler, L. R. 2 Ch. App. 478, 1867; Dwight v. Hayes, IO, 11. 273,
1894; Middlestadt v. Waupaca Co., 93 Wis. I, 1896; Mann v. Willey,
51 N. Y. App. Div. 169, 1900. Compare with these cases McCord v. Iker,
12 Ohio 387, 1843, where the Court treated a defendant who had erected
a dam and backed the water on the plaintiffs land from the point of
view of one accused of nuisance, not trespass.
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so as to render the neighbor powerless to complain if he
"icame to the nuisance" by putting his land to that use, was
stated by Blackstone, and, even as late as 1814, by Lord
Ellenborough. Blackstone tells us: "If my neighbor makes
a tan-yard, so as to annoy and render less salubrious the air
of my house and garden, the law will furnish me with a
remedy; or if he is first in possession of the air and I fix my
habitation near him, the nuisance is of my own seeking and
may continue." 41 Lord Ellenborough thought that a plain-
tiff could not recover where she had opened a window in
the wall of her house through which window entered the
offensive odor of which she complained, the cause of the
odor existing prior to theopening of thewindow. 4 2 The exist-
ence of this doctrine of coming to a nuisance, now thor-
oughly exploded, shows that the true nature of nuisance as
a tort not involving a trespass or assertion of the right to
possession, was not generally grasped by the profession in
the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.43  Is there
' Commentaries, Book II, p. 4o3. He follows this illustration with
a similar one relating to a trespass on an easement in running water.
"If a stream be unoccupied, I may erect a mill thereon and detain the
water; yet not so as to injure my neighbor's prior mill, or his
meadow." And to this illustration he gives the right reason; "for he
hath by the first occupancy acquired a property in the current."
"Lawrence v.. Obee, 3 Camp. 514, 1814, Lord Ellenborough said:
"That the plaintiff having brought the nuisance on herself, by opening
the window, had no right of action."
"In Gale on Easements, p. 417, 7th Ed., I899, edited by Cave, it is
contended that Blackstone was in error in supposing that a person could
obtain a prescriptive right to maintain a nuisance in less than twenty
years. Gale, like Blackstone, does not distinguish between nuisance,
as a tort by interruption, and a trespass on an easement. Gale, con-
fused the two torts because he collected the assize of nuisance cases,
and this action, as we have seen, could be brought to abate a trespass
on an easement as well as a nuisance, the wrong in both cases being
labeled "nuisance." The difference of opinion between Gale and Black-
stone, therefore, does not arise because Gale does not confound a tres-
pass on easements with true nuisances. The two authors merely differ
as to the length of time it took in the eighteenth century and before, to
require an adverse right so as to enable a defendant to successfully
defend an assize of nuisance, whether the assize was brought to abate
an odor, or stop the taking of water from a stream. Blackstone, appar-
ently, takes the position that the defendant in both cases need merely
show that when he first did the act of which the plaintiff complains,
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any wonder that when the fundamental 'substantive rules of
law which apply only to trespass were applied to nuisance,
a rule which was a rule pertaining to the jurisdiction of the
Court over trespass on easements, should also be applied
to nuisance?
he did not do any present damage to the plaintiff. On the other hand,
Gale contends that the defendant had to show that his trespass or his
nuisance had continued for twenty years. The exact law of the ancient
books on the point in controversy is without the scope of this article.
For our present purpose the interesting fact is, that an adverse right
in the nature of an easement could, by prescription, be acquired by the
constant repetition of an act which would be a nuisance to a neighbor
had that neighbor happened to be using his land in a particular way;
in short, that a nuisance; such as filling my neighbor's air with smoke,
was treated as a trespass; i. e., as a taking of possession of his air;
which wrongful taking, if continued long enough, might ripen into an
easement.
It is interesting to compare the assumption that a right to commit
a nuisance may be obtained by prescription, which is unquestionably
the assumption of the early cases, with the more recent cases involving
the same question. Some judges have assumed, that if the acts of which
the plaintiff complains were the repetition of acts which had been
repeated for twenty or more years to the plaintiff's annoyance or the
annoyance of his ancestors in title, an easement to continue the nuisance
would be created. See, for example, Denman, C. J., in Flight v. Thomas,
io A. & E. 590, 1839, at p. 592. Other judges, however, have been
careful to refrain from expressing an opinion on the question whether
our law now recognizes the possibility of the creation of an easement
of this character. See Mr. Justice Coleridge in Murgatroyd v. Robin-
son, 7 E. & B. 391, 1857, at p. 397, and Turner, L. J., in Goldsmid v.
The Tunbridge Wells, Imp. Com., L. R. i Ch. App. Cases, 349, 1866. It
appeals to the writer that there is no good reason why the law should
recognize the possibility of the existence of an easement to pollute the
air, foul a stream, or vibrate the ether, so as to render the neighbors'
comfortable occupation of their lands impossible. If one who suffers
from such nuisance choses to neglect his rights, and fails to bring an
action at law or a bill in equity, he should be barred from any relief
long before the expiration of twenty years; not only because of
his laches, but because his own non-action is almost conclusive proof
that what he alleges to be a nuisance does not interrupt his enjoyment
of the land, and his right to relief depends on the interruption of his
enjoyment. But it is another matter to say, that if the negligent person
referred to parts with his land to another, that other and his succes-
sors in title are forever barred from protesting against the nuisance;
in other words, that the laches of a one-time owner can create in his
neighbor an easement to do an act which may be detrimental to health,
and prevent any profitable use of the subservient land. The recognition
of a new class of easements is always a subject for serious reflection.
The idea that there could be an easement to commit a nuisance is, the
writer believes, due entirely to the accident that the same action
which was used in the old law to abate a nuisance, was also used to
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The result of the foregoing examination of the rule
requiring a trial at law to determine the plaintiff's right in
doubtful cases of nuisance may be summarized as follows:
First, that the rule itself cannot be justified on any theory
applicable to modern conditions.
Second, that, admitting that a feeling once existed, which
was perhaps justified by ancient conditions that a trial at law
should first be had in all cases where chancery was asked to
protect the plaintiff's real property from the acts of the
defendant but the defendant denied the plaintiff's title to
the property and set up title in himself, that fact does not
even explain the application of the rule to cases of nuisance
in which a dispute over title to real property cannot arise.
Third, that the belief of Lord Eldon and other eminent
judges that a trial at law in doubtful cases of nuisance was
necessary, arose from the confusion existing in the minds of
the profession in the eighteenth and early nineteenth cen-
turies between nuisance and trespass on easements, and the
fact that the true nature of the tort nuisance, as a tort
involving only the interruption of use, was not understood.
In England the rule has been abolished by statute for
nearly fifty years. 44  The reform procedure has a similar
abate the wrongful assumption of rights which may properly be recog-
nized as easements, as the right in running water, rights of way, etc.
Fortunately, the possibility of creating an easement to commit a nui-
sance can be discussed on its merits, because, though the one time pro-
fessional opinion recognized the possibility, there are no binding prec-
edents to prevent a re-examination of the question.
Whether or not it is possible to acquire by prescription a right in
the nature of an easement to commit a nuisance, it is now generally
admitted that in such cases the twenty-year period does not begin to
run until there is an actionable nuisance, and no actionable nuisance
arises until what the defendant is doing interrupts the plaintiff in his
present use of his land. Sturges v. Bridgman, L. R. ii Ch. Div. 852,
1879. See also Flight v. Thomas, io A. & E. 590, 1839; Murgatroyd
v. Robinson, io E. & B. 391, 1857.
"In 1862 Lord Hale's Act, 25 and 26 Vict. C. 42, provided that the
Court of Chancery, in those cases in which it would have to refuse or
postpone relief until trial at law, should thereafter either determine
the disputed question itself, or if more convenient, direct an issue to
a jury.
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effect in those States which have adopted it.45 No one can
follow the nuisance cases in the other American jurisdic-
tions without realizing that many judges practically ignore
the rule.4" But, though we may observe that the rule is
dying, it is unfortunately not yet a corpse; and the difficulty
is that no lawyer knows when it will be galvanized into suffi-
cient life to delay and vex his client's pursuit of justice.
Defendants set up the plea that the plaintiffs should first
establish their rights at law as a makeweight-a random
shot, that probably will not, but may, hit something. The
writer submits that the sooner a rule of procedure which had
its origin in confusion of thought, and which never has and
which never can serve any useful purpose that cannot just
as well be accomplished without it, shall be sent to the law's
lumber room for rules acknowledged to be obsolete, the
better it will be for the swift and cerain administration of
adequate relief in a class of cases which is every day becom-
ing more important.
William Draper Lewis.
435 Pom. Eq. 6th Ed. Vol. V, 522, note 6o. See in support of the
assertion Corning v. Troy Iron & Nail Factory, 40 N. Y. 19I, 1869, p.
207, per Grover, J.; Pollett v. Long, 58 Barb. 20, 1870; Lux v. Haggin,
69 Cal. 255, i886, p. 284-5, per McKinstry, Jr.
48 Compare, for instance, the action of the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania in Mowday v. Moore, 133 Pa. 598, 189o, with the action of the
same court in Sullivan v. Jones. & Laughlin Steel Co., 208 Pa. 54o,
19o4. Note the dissenting opinion of the Chief Justice in the last case,
where he takes the position, that as the rights of the parties are con-
flicting "their respective claims should be ascertained at law before
equity is called upon to aid either." That the rights in that case were
conflicting is clear; but they had been elaborately investigated by the
Court below, and the majority of the Supreme Court felt themselves
in a position to dispose of the case finally.
